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1 INTRODUCTION 
We live in a world governed by two sets of institutions. Each set operates 
under the influence of different mentalities and deploys different tech-
nologies. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the governance of secu-
rity. Our institutions of criminal justice exist alongside other institutions, 
primarily corporate ones, which also govern security. An obvious instance 
of this is to be found in policing. Here one finds an increasingly complex 
archipelago of governance with distinctly feudal resonances. pri-
vate security operates in most of the terrains that state police have tradi-
tionally monopolised. There is now a sizeable body of research and 
writing that explores the contours of this network of governance. We now 
know a lot about the contrasting mentalities, institutional forms. tech-
and practices that make up this "neo-medieval" terrain (Bull 
This literature has drawn attention to a variety of problematic conse-
quences associated with the development of this emerging arChipelago of 
governance. One of the most significant of these consequences is that, by 
and private governmental institutions service special, rather than 
more interests. Again this is particularly evident with respect to 
the governance of security. In the policing arena, South Africa provides an 
emblematic example of global developments Perhaps the most visible 
sign of this are the "armed response" signs to be found throughout more 
affluent residential, commercial and industrial settings. These signs do not 
Indicate that South Africa has become more dangerous - although this 
may be true but rather that the state police are no longer the sole or 
even the major providers of "emergency response". This is quite a shift 
as, not very long the police were regarded as the only legitimate 
prOVider of this governmental service both here and elsewhere in the 
world. 
What has happened with respect to "armed response" applies to most, 
if not all, of the other domains of policing as welL While previously people 
did not have a choice of governmental provider, today some people do. 
One interesting consequence of this has been that the state police in 
many parts of the world have sought to become more attractive as service 
providers so that they can stay in business, The slogan of one Canadian 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
police depanment at (he moment is that they would like to become "the 
service provider of choice" This makes them sound very much like an 
airline - "we know that you have a choice of carriers and we are pleased 
that you chose American Airlines", 
Having a choice of governmental service providers is important, Those 
with such choices gain greater control over their lives, become more 
self-directed. For instance. police services that have to compete with 
private security firms for "market share" tend to become much more 
willing to shape their services to meet local requirements, The Ontario 
Provincial Police. for example. now enter very detailed contracts with 
local municipalities about what services they will provide, This enables the 
people affected (0 have greater. and more direct. control over the sort of 
governance they This deepens democracy, If one values democracy. 
then this is a thing. The problem is that this "good" is not equally 
available to . It is something that is unequally distributed. The result has 
been that what might be thought of as a "democratic deficit" has 
emerged. 
Two have been proposed for responding to this. On the one 
hand. it is argued that the solution is to return to a "smgle provider 
model" of governance. This response argues that the best way to deal 
with the "democratic deficit" is to re-establish a state monopoly over 
governance. In the case of policing. the argument is made that we should 
seek to re-establish a state monopoly of policing. This has tended to be 
the dominant response - especially by people who think of themselves as 
belonging to what we used to think of as "the left". They are suspicious of 
market-based forms of service delivery because they see them as inevita-
bly deepening inequality. After all, they point out. a major motive for 
developing the welfare state was a critique of the inequality that had 
resulted from privately-based forms of service provision. 
A second response. that has less support. is that one should respond to 
the inequality that the new governmental forms has created while at the 
same time endorsing the value of more diverse sources of governance. 
This argues that the deepening of democracy that more direct 
control the process of governance provides. is real and valuable. and 
that it should not be abandoned. Rather what we need to do is to explore 
ways of extending these benefits so that they are more broadly accessible. 
This response goes against the established sensibilities of many "progres-
sive" thinkers. It is this unpopular response that I would like to argue for. 
In developing my position. I want to that the problem of inequal-
ity does not necessarily follow from a fracturing of governance. Rather it 
arises when this fracturing is not accompanied by fundamental changes in 
the way public resources are made available. What is required is more 
equal access to resources. This is what a state-based mode of governance 
can. and sometimes does. achieve. But it is not the only way of achieving 
2 Bayley & Shearing 1996. 










































LOCAL CAPACITY POLICING 
this. What we require, in my view, is a strategy that achieves 
equality of access to governmental services while at the same time pro-
moting choice as to how those resources should be spent. This 
would enhance the choices of those who presently have no or few gov-
ernmental options. In short, what is required is a strategy that directly 
addresses the "democratic deficit" by seeking [Q provide greater choice 
and access to resources by those who the market forms that are creating 
diversity of governance presently exclude - namely, poor people, par-
ticularly poor women. 
2 THE REASONS FOR EXCLUSION 
Before I on [Q how this might be done, and how it is being done here 
in Africa. I want [Q spend a moment expanding on why it is that 
poor people are excluded from the advantages that greater choice in 
governance provides In doing so let me begin with what is not the rea-
son. It is not [hat governance has become a commodity that is bought and 
sold through markets. This in itself does not exclude anybody. What 
excludes is the way in which these markets have been regulated. There is 
no such thing as a natural market. All markets are constituted, and this 
regulation determines the forms of access. So, what is the reason? Well, it 
is no surprise its money. This is obvious but it is worth stating. In order 
to participate in governance markets. potential buyers need resources, 
specifically money, that they can exchange for the commodity they want. 
At present, the money available for purchasing governance on markets 
is money that earn, either alone or in groups. In the case of the 
"armed response" the people purchasing the governance are typi-
cally individuals or In addition there are collective clients, that 
is people who put their money in a pot that they use to buy governmental 
services. A good example of this would be Cape Town's Waterfront where 
the merchants contribute [Q their collective security through their rents. 
For the most part, none of this is public money, none of it comes from 
tax. 
Because the money available for participating in markets for govern-
ance is all "private money", this immediately creates inequality. Only 
people with access to money that they have earned - either as individuals 
or as a collective can participate, can play the market. The more one 
has, the more one can buy. The result is obvious. Poor people are excluded. 
So why is only money available? One of the main reasons is that 
all the public money is allocated [Q state agencies so there is none left to 
be given to people to play the governance market. For example, all the 
public money for learning is already "owned" by the state school system. 
The same goes for health. And the same applies to security. The police, 
the courts, correctional services and the army own all the money for the 
governance of security. And there is a lot of money that is owned in this 
way - some R35 billion a year. All this, if it was not all already owned, 
could be used to provide poor people with quite a lot of money that they 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
But it is more than money that is involved. There is also the nature of 
these markets. The markets for governance are almost all markets that 
are designed for constituted for - commercial suppliers. So they privi-
lege those people who can organise themselves as businesses. Again this 
tends to exclude poor people, particularly poor women. And again this is 
not a problem of principle but rather one of It does not have to 
be that way, although it is this way at present. 
These are, of course, not the only issues but, for my presentation, I 
would like (0 limit myself to them. 
3 WHAT TO DO? 
So what can be done about the way in which markets are regulated and 
the problems of access to them? The answer is that a lot can be done if 
we put our minds to finding ways of doing so. Indeed, all over the world a 
lot is being done. In fact when one looks, one finds that quite amazing 
solutions are developed. This is particularly the case where poor 
people find in which they can become engaged in addressing these 
problems. is, where poor people find and occupy spaces in which 
they can become strategists who tackle these problems. One example 
would be what is happening with respect to the provision of shelter and 
micro-enterprise in and through organisations which poor people have 
created, run and control. One can find these organisations in South Africa 
and in many other parts of the world, but especially in Asia. 
A poor people's network is being developed around the issue of security 
in South Africa. It is a network that has had, and continues to have. con-
Siderable government and donor backing. It has its roots in the Western 
Cape but is now spreading (0 other parts of South Africa. At present the 
model that this network has developed has the endorsement of the South 
African Law Commission, which is in the process of developing national 
legislation that will recognise its key elements. 
So, what is this model, how was it developed, how does it work. how 
are the people who use It organised and how does it address the issues I 
have canvassed? 
4 THE ZWELETHEMBA MODEL 
The model was developed by, and within, an informal sealement in 
Zwelethemba, a community in Worcester. In recognition of its origins, we 
call it the Zwelethemba model. The model is intended to directly address 
the democratic deficit within the governance of security by creating 
institutions. with access to resources, for the governance of security that 
poor people direct and operate within what might be thought of as a 
constitutional framework. The model was developed with the full support 
of the Minister of Justice at the time, Dullah Omar, and with the knowl-
and support of the National Commissioner of Police at the time, 
George Fivas. Local magistrates also actively supported its development. 
Work on its development was initially supported by the Swedish govern-










































4.1 Nature and operation 
At the heart of the model are institutions called peace committees. These 
are groups of people who agree to facilitate dispute resolution as well as to 
respond to the more problems that fuel insecurity in communi-
ties. Dispute resolution within the model is called "peacemaking", and 
responding to problems is called "peace building" or "community 
building". These committees work to facilitate the resolution of disputes 
by gathering together the people in the community who are most likely to 
have an interest in. and the knowledge and capacity required to. resolve 
disputes. At these the members of the peace committee in 
attendance work to shift focus of the discussion from the past to the 
future. They do so by defining peace as a state of affairs where the disrup-
tions of the past are less likely to happen - peace is about making the 
future better than the past. The aim of the gathering is to settle on a 
course of action that will promote peace that everyone commits them-
selves to. A key rule that committee members have developed and abide 
by is that no force can be used. or threatened. in developing a course of 
action or in committing people to it. On the basis of the research that 
these committees have been doing. it is now clear that the success rate for 
gatherings - where "success" means that a resolution was agreed upon 
and put into effect is over 90 per cent. 
For each gathering. where the procedures the committees have agreed 
upon are followed. the committee involved receives RIOO. This sum at 
present is provided by donors and by willing local councils. It is enVisaged 
that. in due course. this will be built into the budgets for the governance 
of security in all three of state governance. It is also envisaged 
that this sum will in due course be increased. 
The committees allocate these funds as follows: 30 per cent goes to the 
members of the committee who facilitated the gathering to recognise the 
value of their work. The model opposes the practice of asking poor people 
to do things for free while as a matter of course. get paid, 
Another 30 per cent into a loan fund that the committee loans to 
people in their community to support micro-enterprises. A further 30 per 
cent goes to support a community-building fund that supports what would 
conventionally be called crime prevention programmes. The final 10 per 
cent goes to pay the administrative costs of the committee. 
The model embodies several principles that resonate with the principles 
that underlie the more conventional market forms that have been used to 
commodify the governance of and governance more generally, 
For one thing. it seeks to make risk. and risk reduction. a central concern. 
For another. in reducing risk, it relies heavily on local knowledge and local 
capacity. It also creates a market for security, 
The model also differs in six important respects, 
1. It focuses on mobilising the knowledge and capacity of poor people. 
2. In creating a market for security. it channels tax resources to pay for 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
3, It gives the decision making about how tax resources are to be de-
ployed to the people directly involved and directly affected by the 
governance of security, 
4. It integrates individual interests with collective interests. 
5. Tax resources remain within the community. They provide jobs both 
through creating work for peace committee members and through the 
loan fund. In addition, they are used to build inFrastrucrure within the 
community through peace-bUilding programmes, 
6, Finally, because the money is earned by committee members through 
the peacemaking they do, tax resources are converted into resources 
that people "own". 
At present, peace committees are being developed in several parts of the 
country, As this happens, provincial and national associations of peace 
committees committed to this model are being created. For example, the 
first regional meeting of peace committees for the Western Cape was held 
in Paarl in mid-2000, At this problems were identified and strate-
gies for responding to them were developed. The model was fine-tuned, 
5 CONCLUSION 
Peace commictees provide an opportunity for reshaping the contours of 
the archipelago of governance for security in ways that respond to the 
problems of inequality I outlined at the outset. Peace committees provide 
poor people with greater choice as [0 how problems are to be addressed 
this is built into the process, as it is the people at the gatherings, not state 
experts, who make the decisions. This is also true for peace building. In 
relocating decision making, the Zwelethemba model not only enhances 
security - the success rate for peacemaking, community-building and 
work creation is high but it does so in ways that deepen democracy, In 
doing so, it also reduces the problems of inequality that neo-liberal forms 
of governance have produced 
The South African government has identified crime prevention, job 
creation and nation building as top priorities. Peace committees respond 
to all three of these objectives They do so by mobilising local knowledge 
and capacity, They the job of building South Africa directly to the 
people of South Africa by providing them with the forums within which to 
make decisions and the resources to enable these decisions to be realised. 
Peace committees provide an innovative and creative response to the 
problems of neo-liberal modes of governance without seeking to reintro-
duce the problems of centralised governance that have made neo-
liberalism so attractive to so many people. Peace committees are an 
encouraging example of how one can move beyond the problems associ-
ated with neo-liberal ways of thinking and acring without engaging in 
what Nikolas Rose has called a "simple dismissal" of its mentality, institu-
tions, technology and practices. Peace committees, and similar innova-
tions, seek to respond to neo-Iiberal modes of governance while 
recognising that although there is much water that should be thrown out; 










































LOCAL CAPACITY POLICING 
A final word about the issue of poor women and how peace committees 
respond to their exclusion. First, the composition of peace committees 
tends to be at least half women. This is partly because this is what hap-
pens, but it is also a matter of design. Secondly, within peace committees, 
everyone plays a leadership role. There IS no "command" structure. 
Finally, peace committees spend much of their time responding to dis-
putes involving women. Peace committees do not "empower" women, 
rather they provide forums and arrangements that permit women to 
express and use the power they already have. 
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